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We consider the eﬀect of labor market rigidities on human capital accumulation and
economic growth when some human capital is diﬃcult to observe prior to employment.
We distinguish between two types of human capital, those that formal schooling and test
scores can measure (“knowledge”) and those that can be observed by employers only
after a period of employment (“creativity”). We build a simple model to show when
employers have limited discretion to set wages or terminate employment they favor the
more reliable signals of “knowledge”, such as years of schooling and class rank, at the
expense of “creativity”, which stands for non-testable skills. Individuals in rigid labor
markets will therefore favor greater acquisition of knowledge at the expense of creativ-
ity, which results in distorted accumulation of human capital and lower growth. We
explore the implications of our model for empirical issues in the literatures in education
and growth, and for education policy. We show that accounting for labor market ﬂexi-
bility in cross country growth regressions provides an explanation for the observed low
productivity of schooling in economic growth. A key policy implication of our model is
that education reform in countries with rigid labor markets is unlikely to succeed unless
it is combined with labor market reform that reduces distortions in the incentives for
investments in human capital.
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11 Introduction
The recent economic growth literature has emphasized the importance of human capital
without carefully delineating its characteristics. In this paper we consider the implications
of recognizing that human capital has several dimensions. In particular, we distinguish
between observable characteristics which we call “knowledge” and unobservable character-
istics which we denote “creativity.” Knowledge stands for all cognitive skills that can be
tested and are therefore observable,1 and creativity stands for non-cognitive human capital
that is unobservable, although eventually inferred by employers who observe productivity.
This distinction helps us better describe important choices made by individuals that matter
for economic growth: not just how much to invest in human capital but in which skills to
invest.
Diﬀerences in growth rates across countries arise not only from diﬀerences in the amount
of investment in human capital, but also from diﬀerences in its mix. Societies that promote
a balanced portfolio of skills use investments in human capital more eﬃciently and therefore
grow faster with a given level of investment. Disparities in growth and income, then, can
arise from diﬀerences in the behavior of families, schools, and ﬁrms that determine not only
the amount of investment in people but also inﬂuence the mix of skills people acquire. The
labor market, where rewards to skills are determined, therefore play a critical role in the
eﬃciency of human capital investments.
Although most economists associate human capital with cognitive skills, which are read-
ily measured by years of schooling and test scores, there is growing recognition that human
capital encompasses much more.2 Heckman (2000) notes the “staggering gap between the
list of productivity characteristics available to economic analysts in standard data sources
and what is available to personnel departments of ﬁrms.” Regressions based on the for-
mer typically explain 20 to 30 percent of the variation in wages, whereas personnel data
1Mankiw, Phelps, and Romer (1995, 298) likens knowledge to the quality of society’s textbooks, and
human capital to the amount of time that has been spent reading them. The latter is what we call knowledge.
Our distinction is closer to the dichotomy used in Wise (1975), cognitive vs. aﬀective abilities.
2The economics literature on the subject uses a variety of terms to describe general abilities such as
ambition, leadership, industriousness, entrepreneurship, and social skills, as well as more speciﬁc skills such
as creativity, self-discipline, time preference, motivation, perseverance, tenacity, and teamwork. See Fonseca
et al. 2001; Murnane et al. 2001; Dunifon et al. 2001; Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Carneiro, Cunha, and
Heckman 2003; Heckman 2000; Heckman and Rubinstein 2001, Salehi-Isfahani 2000.
2can explain 60 to 80 percent in professional labor markets (Heckman 1998, Abowd and
Killingsworth 1983). There is also direct evidence that non-cognitive skills are correlated
with labor market success later in life (Wise 1975, Jencks 1979, Filer 1981, Goldsmith 1997,
Dunifon and Duncan 1998, Duncan and Dunifon 1998, Murnane et al. 2001).
Economists have become increasingly interested in the role of non-cognitive skills in
determining productivity, but progress has been slow. In part this is because these skills
are hard to measure (Heckman and Rubinstein 2001), and in part because we tend to
equate unobservable skills with innate ability (Carneiro, Cunha, and Heckman 2003). The
large literature on ‘ability bias’ (Card 2000), creates the impression of a dichotomy between
education, which can be taught and measured, and ability, which is hidden from the econo-
metrician’s eye and therefore presumed innate. But not all that is not measured is innate.
The skills which we call creativity satisfy three criteria:
1. They matter for production
2. They are diﬃcult to measure and verify
3. They can be accumulated.3
The line between innate ability and non-cognitive skills is often blurred, and there are
non-cognitive skills that do not satisfy all three criteria. However, opinion seems to have
shifted over time on the extent to which particular skills can be enhanced through training.
Carneiro, Cunha, and Heckman (2003) make a strong case that the human capital litera-
ture has underestimated the range of skills that can be enhanced by family and personal
investments. Developmental psychologists believe that many non-cognitive skills are indeed
accumulable and try to ﬁnd how to stimulate their growth. There is a large literature and
two specialized journals on creativity alone (Guilford 1986, Sternberg and Lubart 1995).
The business world is full of optimism about our ability to increase leadership and entrepre-
neurship through training, judging by the proliferation of such programs. Still, the evidence
on whether traits such as ambition, self esteem, or creativity are, like intelligence, deter-
mined at birth or can be enhanced by better parenting and coaching is far from complete.
3Thus an important distinction between what we call ‘creativity’ and ‘aﬀective abilities’ used by Wise
(1975) and Murnane et al. (2001) is the emphasis on accumulability.
3For the purpose of this paper we do not need to take a position on which speciﬁc abilities
can be accumulated. We use the term creativity generically to describe the subset of in-
dividual attributes that satisfy criteria 1 through 3, and believe that this subset includes
several important attributes.
The appeal of focusing on diﬀerences in observability of skills is in the way they interact
with labor market rules and regulations, especially those that aﬀect its ﬂexibility. Labor
markets provide signals to individuals about the relative rewards of investments in diﬀerent
dimensions of human capital. Parents, educators, and ultimately children respond to these
rewards by choosing a mix of the two types of human capital. In rigid labor markets, where
layoﬀs are costly and wages may be set administratively according to the level of education,
individuals may over-accumulate formal schooling and under-invest in unobservable human
capital. Labor market rigidity can thus reduce the eﬃciency of human capital investments
and hinder economic growth.
Rigidity can result from a variety of sources. Government legislation can make it costly
for employers to terminate employment at will. For example, in India ﬁrms with more than
100 workers need permission to dismiss workers (Basu, Fields, and Debgupta 2000). In Iran,
the Labor Law authorizes government appointed local councils to review layoﬀ decisions
and ﬁne employers for unfair dismissal. Only recently the Law was amended to exempt
establishments with fewer than ﬁve workers (Salehi-Isfahani 2005). Large public sectors
with costly layoﬀ also contribute to labor market rigidity (Edwards 1997, Haltiwanger and
Singh 1999). Wage scales that tie earnings to diplomas and certiﬁcates are prevalent in the
public sector (e.g., public school systems in the United States) and sometimes in private
sectors of countries with rigid labor markets, such as in the Middle East (Said 2001).
A frequently voiced justiﬁcation for employment protection and wage scales is that they
prevent managers from using their discretion to engage in favoritism and that rewards
should be based only on objective criteria. In many employment settings, particularly in
the public sector, there is constant tension between the allocation of resources (e.g. wages,
procurement contracts) based on objective measures, veriﬁable by an outside observer, and
subjective measures, which are observable by an individual manager or employer, but which
may not be veriﬁed by an outside observer.
4In section 2 we present a simple model to show that when employers lack discretion
to terminate employment, they base their hiring decisions on the more reliable signals of
knowledge, such as years of schooling, test scores and class rank. Hiring workers who may
have non-testable skills is risky, as it is costly to dismiss them if those skills are later found to
be lacking. Instead, hiring decisions will be made only on what can be observed. This leads
individuals in rigid labor markets to favor greater acquisition of knowledge at the expense
of other types of human capital, which results in distorted accumulation of human capital
and lower growth. Where employers can terminate employment at low cost, they can learn
about workers’ non-testable skills after hiring and then and appropriately reward workers as
their productivity is observed. Flexible labor markets, therefore, oﬀer more accurate signals
of productivity for various types of skills and thereby encourage more eﬃcient human capital
accumulation, which is good for economic growth. Our model is related to the signaling and
screening literature initiated by Arrow (1973) and Spence (1973), in which employers take
schooling as a signal of productivity. Signaling models either assume a rigid employment
contract or a long delay before the employer learns about true worker productivity.
We believe that the link that our model establishes between labor market ﬂexibility and
the eﬃciency of human capital formation ﬁlls an important gap in the growth literature
noted by Topel (1999). There is a large literature on the role of labor markets in allocating
people to jobs but, curiously, not in accumulation of human capital and economic growth.
There are complex reasons why ﬂexibility should matter for economic performance. The
literature on incentives argues that ﬂexibility in paying individuals diﬀerentially and the
ability to demote or ﬁre them provides incentives for managers and workers to perform better
on their jobs (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani 1989). Numerous
studies have shown that labor market ﬂexibility is important for employment and economic
growth (Lazear 1990; Heckman and Pages 2000; Fonseca et al. 2001; Botero et al. 2004;
Besley and Burgess 2004; Caballero et al. 2004), though the theoretical debate on the eﬀect
of ﬂexibility on employment is not conclusive (Bertola 1992). The relatively less ﬂexible
labor markets of Europe have been blamed for higher European unemployment rates relative
to the United States (Nickell 1997, and Nickell and Layard 1999, Karanassou and Snower
1998, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005). Our model adds eﬃciency in accumulation of human
5capital to the list of reasons why labor market ﬂexibility may be good for long run economic
growth.
In section 3 we examine the implications of labor market ﬂexibility as developed in
our model for empirical research on the role of education in economic growth. The main
implication of our model, namely, that in ﬂexible and rigid labor markets individuals acquire
diﬀerent portfolios of observable and unobservable human capital, is by its nature very
diﬃcult to test. Therefore, in this section we pursue the more modest aim of illustrating
the importance of labor market institutions in understanding social and private returns
to education. In section 3.1 we take up a key puzzle in the empirical growth literature,
the low observed social returns to education. In cross-country regressions the coeﬃcient
of growth of years of schooling is often zero or negative, a ﬁnding which is at odds with
the emphasis growth theory has placed on human capital (Benhabib and Spiegel 1994;
Berthelemy, Dessus, and Varoudakis 1997; Pritchett 2001; Pritchett 2006). We argue that
this may be because these regressions do not account for variation in labor market ﬂexibility
across countries. According to our model, years of schooling is only a good proxy for human
capital where labor markets are ﬂexible. In countries with rigid labor markets, where
individuals are likely to focus on formal education at the expense of less observable skills,
years of schooling can be a poor predictor of human capital. Thus, ignoring the variation
in labor market ﬂexibility across countries results in a (downwardly) biased coeﬃcient for
schooling. By including this variation (as a binary variable) in a standard growth regression,
we show that the eﬀect of schooling on growth in ﬂexible countries is large while in rigid
economies it is nil.
The estimated low social return to schooling is a bigger anomaly when viewed in the
context of large private rates of returns estimated from Mincer-type regressions on micro
data (Krueger and Lindahl 2001, Pritchett 2006). In section 3.2 we consider the relationship
between private returns and labor market ﬂexibility. In our model ﬁrms in rigid markets
reward diplomas instead of skills, a phenomenon known as credentialism. In countries with
rigid labor markets private returns to secondary and tertiary degrees tend to be high relative
to basic education because basic education is mainly valued as the path to higher degrees.
We examine cross country data on returns to primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling
6for evidence of a relationship between diﬀerences in the secondary and tertiary premiums
and labor market ﬂexibility. We ﬁnd only weak indications that the average premiums are
higher in rigid countries. Despite weak results, given the rather compelling case one can
make for the divergence of private Mincer returns from individual productivity based on
theory alone, there is reason to think that the practice of using estimates of private returns
from wage data to calculate schooling capital may overestimate schooling capital in rigid
countries (which are predominantly developing countries), and thereby present an overly
pessimistic view of their total factor productivity growth.
In section 4 we brieﬂy discuss the implications of our model for human capital policy.
The analysis of this paper has important implications for education and labor market re-
forms. Most education reform ignores the role of labor markets and focuses on eﬃcient
incentives for educators but not families. Strikingly, a well functioning education system
in which teachers and school administrators are fully responsive to parents and students
may become a mere diploma mill when the signals it receives from the labor market are
distorted. To set the incentives right for parents, students and educators, reform of the
labor market to increase its ﬂexibility, and thereby better align private and social returns
to a wider range of skills, should precede education reform. Section 5 oﬀers concluding
remarks.
2 Model
A simple one period version of the model provides the basic intuition for how rigid labor
markets can induce ineﬃcient tradeoﬀs between observable and unobservable human cap-
ital.4 Even this simple version illustrates how using schooling as the measure of human
capital can overstate the productive eﬀects of an economy’s investments in education.
Our model is primarily concerned with the incentives for individuals to build eﬃcient
portfolios of human capital when one component of those portfolios is unobservable. But,
as we consider the basic model, a natural question arises: “What happens when the ﬁrm
observes the worker’s productivity?” One might assume this problem away; perhaps assum-
4For more sophisticated models of how ﬂexibility aﬀects worker incentives, see Lazear (1990).
7ing that observing the productivity of individual workers is costly, or it takes long enough
to observe productivity that a model of the initial negotiation based only on the worker’s
observable characteristics captures most of the important elements. This is essentially the
path chosen by Spence (1973). We ﬁrst consider a short run economy of this kind where
only observability matters: can ﬁrms observe workers’ complete human capital portfolios,
or can they only observe one component?
But ﬁrms are likely to eventually observe workers’ true productivity and respond to the
new information (Jovanovic 1979, Farber and Gibbons 1996). In the long run, we assume
that this is the case and consider two possibilities: in the ﬁrst, ﬁrms face no restrictions on
hiring and ﬁring. They are free to contract and so we consider the incentives individuals
have in the face of the ﬁrms’ anticipated actions: to either eﬃciently allocate their human
capital endowments or to allocate their endowments in a distorted fashion. Second, we
consider the case in which ﬁrms, for legal reasons, face restrictions on contracting. Here,
hiring is conducted knowing that initial wages cannot be later revised in the face of new
information about worker productivity.
2.1 Short run
We initially restrict our attention to a world with no tomorrow: all decisions are short run
decisions. The simpliﬁcation highlights some of the important tradeoﬀs faced by individuals
and ﬁrms and also allows us to show how this model relates to and diﬀers from signaling
models. We begin with the benchmark case of full observability in which, as in the standard
human capital model, individual decisions maximize individual earnings and total output.
We then consider how decisions and outcomes change when one type of human capital is
unobservable.
2.1.1 Full observability
Suppose that productivity is a function of human capital only, but that human capital has
two components: knowledge (n) and creativity (r). Individual productivity is described by




Let f be symmetric and choose units such that fn = fr and fnn = frr.
Individuals are born with a human capital endowment e which may be allocated to
either knowledge (n) or creativity (r). The two are “produced” from the endowment e. For
simplicity we assume that the marginal rate of transformation is -1:
n + r = e (1)
Endowments are ﬁxed (at birth) at level e and individuals have a one-time decision to
make regarding their endowment allocation. One might imagine that education increases
e, so that both n and r can increase with expenditure of resources. But in our model the
role of education is to allocate a ﬁxed endowment between knowledge and creativity. One
can think of the role of learning, at home and at school, as the movement along the budget
constraint imposed by e. The tradeoﬀ postulated here reﬂects the limited time of the parents
and the children in engaging in various activities that promote diﬀerent skills. For example,
in some East Asian and Middle Eastern countries entry into universities, and later into
desirable jobs, depends critically on grades in schools and on national tests. Test preparation
competes intensely for parent’s and children’s time, pushing aside other activities such as
sports or group projects at school that may enhance, for instance, the ability to work in
teams. Students in these countries place almost total emphasis on memorization of facts
and preparation for tests.5 Indeed, heated competition for grades and for limited places in
public universities may reduce the ability to work in teams, resulting in a negative relation
5Ono (1999) describes the so-called “examination hell” in Japan and the vast amount of time students
spend preparing for university entrance examinations, known as ronin. In Egypt, private tutoring is a
bustling industry absorbing 1.6 percent of the GDP (World Bank 2002). In Iran, one observer lamented the
pressure put on students by their parents who employ the services of “large and small classes for concour
[the national entrance examination], and highly paid private tutors ...depriving their children of all forms
of relaxation, even bathing. Quoted in Salehi-Isfahani (2002).
9between testable and not-testable skills.
Our formulation of the tradeoﬀ ignores complex interactions between various attributes.
It is more accurate to think of knowledge as an input into production of creativity. Non-
cognitive skills such as ambition, self control, and time preference help in the learning of
facts and techniques. Indeed, in a model of early childhood development, Carneiro, Cunha,
and Heckman (2003) emphasize complementarity among a variety of skills. However, we
believe that our simple construct captures well our idea that, at the margin, individuals
who are acquiring human capital face a choice between those aspects of human capital that
are observable and those that are not. It helps us focus on our main objective which is to
study the impact of labor market characteristics on the allocation of resources to diﬀerent
types of human capital.
Firms employ constant returns to scale production technologies in which the only input
is labor. Therefore, the marginal product of a worker characterized by the human capital
portfolio (n,r) is:
MPL = f(n,r) (2)
In the benchmark full observability economy, ﬁrms observe workers’ complete human
capital portfolios. Then, the perfectly competitive ﬁrms oﬀer wage contracts:
ˆ w(n,r) = f(n,r) (3)
Individuals recognize that ﬁrms will oﬀer these contracts and allocate their human capital
endowments to knowledge and creativity to maximize their income:
Maximize
(n,r)
ˆ w(n,r) = f(n,r)
s.t. n + r = e
Assuming an interior solution exists in which both knowledge and creativity are productive
(that is, assume lim
n→0
fn = ∞, lim
r→0








Figure 1 depicts the individual’s optimal choice of a human capital portfolio, given his
















































Figure 1: Choice of knowledge and creativity; short run, full observability
to knowledge and creativity, and the strict concavity in n and r, the optimal allocation of
an endowment e splits it evenly across knowledge and creativity:




Individuals earn w∗ = f(n∗,r∗), which maximizes their earnings; these choices in aggregate
also maximize total output.
2.1.2 Unobservable creativity
The primary alternative we wish to highlight relative to the benchmark full observability
economy is an economy in which one component of human capital is unobservable. Here,
the economy is still a short run economy in which, in standard neo-classical fashion, the
market exists at a point in time. Production is a function of both knowledge and creativity,
11as in the benchmark economy. However, only the testable component of human capital,
knowledge, is observable to employers. Therefore, ﬁrms oﬀer prospective employees a wage
contract conditional on observed knowledge, ˆ w(n).
Individuals choose to allocate their endowments between knowledge and creativity to




s.t. n + r = e
A worker’s best response to this wage contract is to ignore the productive aspects of cre-
ativity and allocate his entire endowment to knowledge:
(n∗
u,r∗
u) = (e,0), (6)
where (n∗
u,n∗
r) denote a worker’s optimal portfolio when creativity is unobservable. Indi-
viduals pretending to have higher endowments show their level of knowledge and hope that
ﬁrms infer that their level of creativity is commensurate with their knowledge. Of course,
in equilibrium, ﬁrms will infer individuals’ true level of creativity. But, it would not be
proﬁtable for individuals to increase their productivity by increasing their investment in
creativity at the expense of knowledge.
The choice is illustrated in Figure 2; the most productive allocation of endowment
e allows the worker to reach the output level represented by Isoquant A. By signaling
knowledge level n = e, he purports to be able to produce at the level represented by
Isoquant B, but actually (given his choice of (n,r) = (e,0)) can only reach the output level
represented by Isoquant C. To be consistent with workers’ choices, ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximizing
wage contracts when creativity is unobservable will be:
ˆ w(nu) = f(nu,0) (7)





Isoquant B: {(n,r) : f(n,r) = f(e,e)}
Isoquant A: {(n,r) : f(n,r) = f( e
2, e
2)}



















































Figure 2: Productivity and human capital portfolio allocations
human capital allocations to maximize their earnings. But, unlike the benchmark economy,
in the economy with unobservable creativity total output is not maximized.
Below, we show that the structure of the labor market, that is, the ability of ﬁrms to
contract freely and to re-negotiate wage contracts in the face of new information about
worker productivity, has a critical role to play in inﬂuencing the eﬃciency of human capital
allocation. But here, in the short run, labor market rigidity matters not at all. There is no
opportunity to re-negotiate since the economy has no dynamic structure.
This timeless structure is a standard component of the basic neo-classical model (prior to
the introduction of Arrow-Debreu state contingent claims); it is also the basis for the basic
signaling model (Spence 1973). The signaling model of education is akin to what we outline
here, but diﬀers in important respects. In the classic signaling economy ﬁrms are unable
to directly assess workers’ productivity. Firms make inferences about workers’ productivity
conditional on an unproductive observable characteristic: formal schooling. These inferences
may be useful because the costs of acquiring education vary with workers’ productivity. In
our economy, formal schooling is productive. Workers vary in their endowments, but the
cost of acquiring an additional unit of the observable signal, knowledge, is constant: one
13unit of creativity. Workers’ endowments limit the amount of knowledge (and creativity)
which can be acquired, but do not directly aﬀect the cost of acquiring knowledge.
2.2 Long run
Here we extend the basic model to allow for the revelation of information about worker
productivity in a simple, natural way. We consider a two-period economy in which period
one represents the “short run,” the period in which ﬁrms’ are not able to adjust their initial
hiring decisions. Much like the standard deﬁnition of short run and long run, we consider
the short run to encompass the period in which the ﬁrms’ initial wage oﬀer governs the
employment relationship. Clearly, this period’s chronological measurement depends on the
institutional arrangements of the economy in question. In a world in which employment
is at will, this period is likely to be relatively short; although here the binding constraint
might be the speed at which the ﬁrm can update its assessment of the worker’s productiv-
ity. If information about productivity is revealed only slowly, then the short run would,
chronologically, be longer than it would be if information is revealed quickly. Jovanovic
(1979) shows how wage dynamics and turnover evolve in an economy with job matching.
In a sense, our economy features a much simpler version of Jovanovic’s matching; our ﬁrms
are concerned with “matching” wage oﬀers to worker productivity.
2.2.1 Full observability
There are two periods, period one “the short run”, and period two “the long run.” When
workers’ human capital portfolios are fully observable, ﬁrms know what the marginal prod-
uct of a worker with portfolio (n,r) will be in each period. Therefore, ﬁrms oﬀer wage
contracts in period one of:
ˆ w(n,r) = f(n,r) + βF(n,r), (8)
F(n,r) is period two productivity and period two payments are discounted by a factor
0 < β < 1. Although the two period structure is convenient, period two, which represents
the long run, is likely to be “longer” than period one. For instance, period two may represent
14the on-going future, so let the value of a worker’s production in the long run be:





Given wage oﬀers in (8), and full observability of human capital, individuals choose to
allocate their human capital endowments just as they did in the short run world with full
observability:




Given these allocations, workers earn F(n∗,r∗) which maximizes their earnings and total
output.
2.2.2 Unobservable creativity, ﬂexible labor markets
Suppose now that the economy still has both a short run (period one) and a long run (period
two), but now creativity is unobservable. Firms, in period one, hire workers with observable
(or veriﬁable) knowledge, but the ﬁrms can only guess at the workers’ creativity. We
assume that the educational system signals each worker’s testable human capital, knowledge,
accurately, but revelation of creativity is only possible after the individual has worked for
an employer.
First, we examine the equilibrium of a ﬂexible labor market. By a ﬂexible labor market
we mean one in which ﬁrms can freely adjust wages and lay oﬀ workers. In a ﬂexible labor
market individuals will have more incentives to develop their n and r eﬃciently because
those who misrepresent their overall human capital portfolio (their true level of creativity)
can only do so for a limited time. Distortions away from the optimal allocation (represented
by Isoquant A in Figure 2) have long run consequences.
We assume a simple structure for long run beliefs: workers searching for employment in
period two are assumed by ﬁrms to have masqueraded as more productive workers in period
one (i.e. their actual level of productivity corresponds to Isoquant C) and subsequently ﬁred.
15These beliefs are conﬁrmed in equilibrium. In period two, ﬁrms oﬀer wage contracts of:
ˆ w2(n) = F(n,0), (11)
and in period one contracts of:






L = ˆ w1
0 otherwise
(12)
Workers who allocate their endowments to maximize productivity are paid their marginal
product in each period; they are employed by the same ﬁrm in both the short run and the
long run. Those workers who masquerade as more productive workers are ﬁred in the long
run. Long run labor markets clear, however, and so these workers are hired, but at lower
wages than they initially earned.
What should an individual do to maximize his lifetime earnings? If a worker with
endowment e, for whom n∗ = e/2, allocates his endowment productively, his payoﬀ will be:
F(n∗,n∗) (13)
If he chooses to masquerade, his payoﬀ will be:
f(2n∗,2n∗) + βF(2n∗,0) (14)
He will choose to allocate his human capital endowment productively if:
F(n,n) ≥ f(2n,2n) + βF(2n,0)
or
f(n,n) ≥ (1 − β)f(2n,2n) + βf(2n,0)
(15)
When ﬁrms can ultimately deal with workers who misrepresent their true productivity, a
16worker’s decision of whether to allocate his endowment eﬃciently is based on a comparison
of his productive output, f(n,n), to a convex combination of the productivity he pretends
to have, f(2n,2n), and his true productivity, f(2n,0). As the future becomes more valu-
able (the larger is β), the more important is the on-going wage, f(2n,0). If the future
is discounted heavily, then misrepresentation may be attractive, even if the worker will
be ﬁred once his true productivity is revealed. Misrepresentation is also more attractive
when the period one gain, f(2n,2n) is large, and when the ultimate penalty, the diﬀerence
f(n,n) − f(2n,0), is small. The concavity of the productivity function which determines
the magnitude of this diﬀerence depends, among other things, on the level of technology.
As technology becomes more sophisticated, the importance of creativity for production
increases and so do losses from having a rigid labor market and a test-based education
system.
Suppose that (15) is satisﬁed; ﬁrms, knowing that workers will allocate their endow-
ments eﬃciently, will be willing to oﬀer the wage contracts (12) and (11). Here, because
of ﬂexibility, time enables the economy to overcome the ineﬃciencies resulting from the
unobservability of creativity.
2.2.3 Unobservable creativity, rigid labor markets
Now assume that creativity is still unobservable, but in addition labor markets are rigid.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that ﬁrms are unable to revise initial wage oﬀers after a worker’s true
productivity is revealed. Our model describes a market with wage scales based on objective
“measures” only.
Now, time does nothing to improve the eﬃciency of human capital allocation. Just as
in the short run economy in which creativity is unobservable, ﬁrms can oﬀer wage contracts
which are conditional on observable human capital n. However, because the wages of less
productive workers (i.e. those whose marginal product is f(e,0) rather than f(e/2,e/2)
in period one) cannot be revised downwards (or ﬁred) there is no incentive for workers to
choose eﬃcient allocations ex ante. Individuals choose:
(nu,ru) = (e,0) (16)
17In equilibrium, ﬁrms expect that all workers choose ineﬃcient allocations, so ﬁrms oﬀer
contracts:
ˆ w1(n) = f(n,0)
ˆ w2(n) = F(n,0) (17)
The ﬁrms’ beliefs are conﬁrmed and workers all choose to ineﬃciently allocate their endow-
ments. Because labor markets are rigid, workers never receive the appropriate signals as
to how to allocate their human capital endowments. If we wish to equate knowledge with
formal schooling, individuals may acquire a great deal of “education” and work diligently
to improve their outcomes as best as they can, given the institutional structure they face.
However, their eﬀorts are largely for naught, since the signals they get give no guidance
concerning the long run value of their overall human capital portfolio.
3 Labor market ﬂexibility and empirical issues in education
and growth
According to Barro (1998, 3), “long lasting diﬀerences in [basic political, legal, and eco-
nomic institutions] across countries have proven empirically to be among the most important
determinants of diﬀerences in rates of economic growth.” Diﬀerences in labor market insti-
tutions are perhaps among the most signiﬁcant of these diﬀerences (Botero et al. 2004), yet
the large empirical literature on cross-country growth regressions has given little attention
to the role of labor markets (Topel 1999). Our model makes a strong case for taking into
account cross-country variation in labor market ﬂexibility in understanding the productivity
of education. In this section we examine the implications of this proposition for social and
private returns to education. In section 3.1 we re-examine the estimation of social (macro)
returns from cross country regressions. By including readily available measures of ﬂexibility
in the standard cross-country regressions, we show that social returns to education are high
in countries with ﬂexible markets and zero in rigid countries. Cross country data on private
returns are much less reliable, but we ﬁnd weak indication that estimated private returns
18tend to be higher in rigid countries. As noted earlier, the purpose of our empirical exercises
is not to test the implications of our model, but to illustrate the importance of taking labor
market institutions for understanding individual and social productivity to education. To
the extent that we succeed in doing so, we conﬁrm our general approach to skill formation.
3.1 The “missing education” puzzle
It is well known that in cross country regressions of growth the coeﬃcient of increase in years
of schooling — the most commonly used measure of human capital — is often insigniﬁcant
and sometimes even negative (Benhabib and Spiegel 1994, Borenstein et al. 1999, Levin and
Raut 1997, Pritchett 2001, and Pritchett 2006).6 A diﬀerent formulation of the hypothesis,
that the initial level of schooling promotes subsequent growth, does ﬁnd support empirically
(Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992), but the question remains as to why increase in education
fails to explain growth of output. In his survey of labor markets and growth, Topel (1999,
2964) concludes that, “the empirical growth literature does not lend much support to the
idea that human capital, at least as represented by measured educational attainment, is a
key element of economic growth.”
The insigniﬁcance of the schooling coeﬃcient may be attributed to well-known prob-
lems with measuring schooling across countries (Behrman and Rosenzweig 1994). Attempts
have been made to deal with these problems by introducing measures of quality of school-
ing (Barro 1998, Hanushek and Kimko 2000) and correcting for measurement error in the
schooling variable (Krueger and Lindahl 2001). These attempts have been by and large
successful, thereby conﬁrming that more accurate measurement of human capital can lead
to a more signiﬁcant schooling eﬀect on growth. The hypothesis advanced in this paper sug-
gests yet another diﬃculty with years of schooling as a measure of human capital, namely,
that schooling produced in countries with rigid and ﬂexible labor markets are not the same.
In ﬂexible markets formal schooling represents an eﬃcient combination of observable and
non-observable skills, whereas in rigid markets years of schooling mean just that.
A quick look at the correlation between labor market ﬂexibility and growth of school-
6This is by no means a uniform result. See Temple (2001) and Gemmell (1996) who ﬁnds a positive
relationship for his carefully constructed overall measure of schooling, but still ﬁnds that growth of secondary
education has a negative (but insigniﬁcant) eﬀect on growth.
19Table 1: Average performance of countries with ﬂexible and rigid labor markets (Heritage
index), 1960-2000 averages
Flexible Rigid All
Investment/GDP ratio 19.10 14.33 16.72
Growth of GDP per capita (trend) 2.01 1.12 1.56
Growth of GDP per capita (average) 2.35 1.12 1.82
Growth of schooling 25+ (trend) 1.74 3.01 2.37
Growth of schooling 25+ (average) 1.77 3.22 2.40
Number of observations (trend) 47 42 89
Number of observations (average) 47 37 84
Notes: Average growth rates of GDP per capita and years of schooling measure the annual percentage
increase from the mean value for 1960-70 to the mean value for 1990-2000; trend growth rates are calculated
from regressions of log of the variable on year for all countries with at least 15 years of observation.
ing indicates why ﬂexibility might be relevant in understanding the relationship between
schooling and growth. In Table 1 we divide a sample of countries into more and less ﬂexible
according to their score for the degree of government control of wages and prices as calcu-
lated by the Heritage Foundation (see Appendix for a detailed description of this and other
indices). Those with scores of 1-3 – about half of the sample – are classiﬁed as ﬂexible and
the rest as rigid. During 1960-2000, ﬂexible countries on average invested 5.5 percent more
of their GDP per year and grew twice as fast, while their growth in schooling was 45% lower
than rigid countries. According to this table, growth of schooling and output are correlated
in the ﬂexible, but not in the rigid group of countries. Thus, a sample composed of both
types of countries is unlikely to yield a reliable estimate of the relation between schooling
and growth.
If our conjecture regarding the ineﬃcient portfolio of human capital in rigid countries
is correct, this table may have an explanation for why in countries with faster growth of
schooling, quality of education may have been lower. It also suggests why accounting for
quality in the growth regressions may help improve the estimation of the coeﬃcient of
education in growth regressions. However, as Pritchett (2001) has noted, in order for the
negative coeﬃcient of education on growth to turn positive, a strong negative correlation
must exist between quantity and quality of education. We believe our model suggests one
reason why this might be the case.
This table also suggests that the puzzle of “missing education” can be usefully viewed as
20a problem of omitted variable, caused by the omission from the right hand of a variable to
account for labor market institutions. If the link we have established between labor market
ﬂexibility and the composition of human capital is valid, the actual omitted variable is a
measure of non-observable human capital. This variable is highly correlated with years of
schooling in the ﬂexible group of countries but not in the rigid group (as in the model of
section 2.2.2). To see this, consider a standard neoclassical growth model with constant
returns to scale and Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = AtKα
t (htLt)1−α (18)
in which eﬀective labor inputs are a function of human capital, h. In per capita growth rate
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As just noted, in a sample of economies with ﬂexible labor markets, growth of schooling
7This relaxes the assumption that knowledge and creativity enter production symmetrically; since that
assumption simply involved a convenient choice of units for analytical purposes, it would be inappropriate
here.
21and creativity should be highly correlated and the estimate of b2 from (23) would pick up
the contributions of both schooling and creativity, β2+β3.8 This might be inconvenient but
presents no real problem: individuals and policy makers recognize, implicitly or explicitly,
the contributions of schooling and creativity and the econometrician measures their joint
contribution to productivity. However, in a sample of countries with diﬀerent degrees of
labor market ﬂexibility, which is the staple of the empirical growth literature, omitting r
leads to an omitted variable bias. The bias is likely to aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcient of n
more strongly than k (see below) because variation in labor market ﬂexibility is likely to
induce a negative correlation between the growth rates of n and r, resulting in a negative
bias. All else equal, in less ﬂexible economies individuals would acquire more schooling (and
less creativity) than individuals in ﬂexible economies, causing the negative correlation. We
argue that this may be a key reason why schooling has failed to ﬁgure signiﬁcantly in
cross-country regressions.
In light of the fact that it is very diﬃcult, if not impossible, to obtain measures of
the less observable worker attributes, we can improve the estimation of (20) indirectly by
controlling for labor market ﬂexibility. Labor market ﬂexibility is also diﬃcult to pin down
empirically (Schultz 2000), but there are a few published measures, such as by the Heritage
Foundation (2002), the Economist Intelligence Unit (2004), and the World Bank (2003a),
that rank countries on regulation and the degree to which wages and prices are set by the
market vs. the government (for details see Data Appendix). We also use the share of
government wage bill in GDP, which reﬂects the degree to which signals provided by public
sector employment policies aﬀect incentives for human capital accumulation. Neither of
these measures is ideal for our purposes, but they help us distinguish between groups of
countries with more or less regulation of employment and wages. To examine whether the
eﬀect of schooling on growth depends on the level of labor market ﬂexibility, we use the
same binary measure of ﬂexibility that we used in Table 1 as a dummy variable in this
regression:
8This is consistent with evidence presented by Topel (1999) that growth estimates of the eﬀects of human
capital are too large relative to the consensus (and not too controversial) estimates of returns to education
from individual level data. It is also consistent with more accurate estimates of the education eﬀect for the
more homogenous group of OECD countries.
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Growth of per capita income y is related to the investment-GDP ratio I/Y , a proxy for
the rate of physical capital accumulation, and growth of schooling. The contribution of
schooling to growth is allowed to vary between ﬂexible and rigid countries. For ﬂexible
countries (dummy= 0) the eﬀect of schooling on growth is α2 while for rigid countries
(dummy= 1) it is α2 + α3.
If our intuition in this paper is correct, α3 < 0 so that α2 + α3 would be small, indi-
cating little beneﬁt from formal schooling on growth in countries with rigid labor markets.
We would also expect α2 to be positive and larger than the estimates obtained using the
misspeciﬁed equation (without the interaction dummy), because, as noted earlier, for these
economies schooling stands for both observable and unobservable human capital. Although
this method uses the existing measures of labor market institutions in a somewhat limited
way, it does provide a straightforward way to see if the eﬀect of schooling on output is
higher in countries with ﬂexible than rigid labor markets.
Barro (1998) and Forteza and Rama (2001) use indices of labor market ﬂexibility to
explain growth performance. Forteza and Rama (2001) ﬁnd that countries with more ﬂex-
ible markets recover faster from recessions, while Barro (1998) did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
relationship between labor market ﬂexibility and growth. The poor quality of data on labor
market ﬂexibility makes it diﬃcult to conclude much from either study.9
We use indices of labor market ﬂexibility from three sources, but believe that index
produced by the Heritage Foundation (2002) comes closest to what we are modeling in this
paper (see Appendix for description of the indices). The Heritage index scores government
control of wage and prices from 1 (least control) to 5 (see Table 2). The distribution of the
index (see Table 2) readily suggests the threshold for a binary deﬁnition of rigidity: equal
9Barro (1998) uses the number of ratiﬁcations with the International Labor Organizations (ILO) and
concludes that while the results point to a reduction in growth and increase in human capital investment,
the ILO variable fails to capture the eﬀect of labor market restrictions. Forteza and Rama (2001) use a
mixture of several labor market characteristics to study the eﬀect of structural reform. Their index does not
measure those aspects of ﬂexibility highlighted by our model. For example, China is ranked number 3 in
ﬂexibility, above the United States (23) and United Kingdom (77), presumably because it does not recognize
independent unions or have treaties with the ILO. In our view, the large state sector in China should place
it among the rigid countries.
23Table 2: The Heritage index for wages and prices control
Score Rigidity Determination of wages and prices Number
1 Very low Market determines wages and prices, 3
no eﬀective minimum wage
2 Low Market determines most prices, 63
minimum wage may or may not be eﬀective
3 Moderate Mixture of market and government determines wages and prices 66
minimum wage applied eﬀectively
4 High Market determines few wages and prices, 15
government sets most wages.
5 Very high Wages and prices almost completely 4
controlled by the government
Note: Number of countries in the sample reported by Heritage Foundation.
Source: Heritage Foundation (2002)
to one if the index is greater than or equal to three and zero otherwise. Most countries
have values of 2 or 3, and very few countries are in the two extremes of 1 and 5. The EIU
index of wage regulation is very similar to the Heritage index in terms of construction and
method of calculation, but it is only available for half the sample. World Bank (2003a) oﬀers
a more comprehensive data on ﬂexibility, and diﬀers from the other two in that it relies
more systematically on laws and regulations that impinge on employer decisions (Botero
et al. 2004). It is less suitable for our purposes because it refers to later years when several
countries have been actively dismantling these laws, and it tends to be less sensitive to
actual implementation of employment regulation that the Heritage and EIU indices. Table
3 shows the distribution of scores and the dummy variables that are based on the median
scores for each index. We use a fourth index of ﬂexibility based on the share of public
sector wages in GDP. In most developing countries public sector employment, in which the
educated are usually heavily over represented, has the most rigid rules for compensation
and ﬁring, and thus tends to push education aspirations toward credentialism. A larger
size of the public sector should thus imply a more rigid labor market and a less eﬃcient
portfolio of skills. The entire sample with key regression variables is presented in a data
appendix (Table A.1).
Table 4 compares the Heritage classiﬁcation of ﬂexibility with the other three. There is
some correlation between the Heritage and World Bank indices match well at the extremes of
the distribution but not in the middle. As noted earlier, this may be because the World Bank
24Table 3: World Bank indices of labor market regulations
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Employment laws index 107 49.7 13.8 19 78
Hiring laws 107 45.6 15.7 0 80
Firing laws 107 36.2 18.4 0 73
Dummy variable for hiring laws 96 0.5 0.5 0 1
0 (%) 48 50
1 (%) 48 50
Dummy variable for ﬁring laws 107 0.5 0.5 0 1
0 (%) 53 49.5
1 (%) 54 50.5
Table 4: Comparison of labor market ﬂexibility indices (mean values)
Heritage EIU World Bank Government
index Hiring Firing wage share
1 3.50 45.5 28.0 3.87
2 3.50 45.2 33.6 5.88
3 3.25 47.3 39.5 7.25
4 2.67 40.9 35.5 7.79
5 – 68.0 73.0 –
Note: The Heritage index measures wage and price controls, the World Bank indices are for regulations of
employers’ hiring and ﬁring practices and range from 0-100, and the government wage share is the ratio
(x100) of public sector wages and salaries to GDP.
rankings rely more on laws and regulations while the Heritage index emphasizes perceived
enforcement. The EIU and Heritage indices are slightly more closely correlated (negatively,
because EIU deﬁnes 1 as “high regulation”), in part because because the Heritage index uses
EIU data in constructing its own index. The size of the government wage bill as percentage
of GDP shows a close correlation between the importance of government employment and
rigidity as measured by the Heritage index.
A caveat for these indices (except the one based on government wages and salaries) is
that to obtain a larger sample we have to use more recent values, which may not reﬂect
accurately the average conditions of labor market ﬂexibility for the entire period, 1960-
2000.10 This should not present a major problem, because only a handful of countries
experienced substantial change in labor market institutions, mainly the former socialist
10In the case of EIU, we were able to use data from 1995, striking a balance between an early date and
sample size.
25countries after 1990, which are excluded from our sample because they lack data on growth
of GDP for earlier years. Lack of data on labor market ﬂexibility for earlier years and
the long term nature of the relationship between changes in labor market institutions and
investment in human capital necessitates looking at growth over a longer period.
Data on growth of GDP per capita and the ratio of investment to GDP are taken from
the Penn World Tables Mark 6.1, and growth of years of schooling are from Barro and
Lee (2000). Because labor market institutions aﬀect education over a long period of time,
we do not employ the more powerful panel approach, and look for the determinants of
average growth over the entire period. To avoid sensitivity to end point values of GDP per
capita and schooling, we calculate growth rates using a regression trend line for 1965-2000
(including in the sample only countries with at least 15 years of observation).11 Summary
statistics in Table 1 show that the estimates of growth from both methods are very close,
and regression results based on them are nearly identical.
The results are presented in Table 5. In column 1 we reproduce the well-known missing
education puzzle: the estimated coeﬃcient of schooling in the misspeciﬁed equation (23),
which treats schooling in all countries the same, is not diﬀerent from zero. In column 2-6,
where the dummy variable allows for diﬀerent eﬀects of schooling on growth in rigid and
ﬂexible countries, we produces results that are essentially what we saw in Table 1. The
most favorable results to our model are in regressions based on the Heritage index and the
size of the government wage bill as percentage of GDP (columns 2 and 6, respectively). For
countries with ﬂexible labor markets, the coeﬃcient of schooling is positive and signiﬁcant
and much higher (0.545 in column 2 and 0.461 in column 6), while for rigid countries the
estimated coeﬃcient (the sum of this schooling coeﬃcient plus the interaction term) is close
to zero in column 2 and negative in column 6. The remaining columns show similar but
weaker results. The EIU regression in column 3 exaggerates the eﬀect of schooling, and the
coeﬃcient of the interaction variable is not signiﬁcant in the regressions using World Bank
data, though they all have the right sign. These results clearly show that the correlation
between growth of years of schooling and growth of income is diﬀerent in the two sets of
11We repeated the regressions using growth rates taking average values for 1960-70 and 1990-2000 as end
points. The results were the same.
26Table 5: The eﬀect of labor market ﬂexibility on growth of GDP per capita
Independent No dummy Heritage EIU WB ﬁring WB hiring Govt. wage
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment/GDP 0.145∗ 0.142∗ 0.122∗ 0.147∗ 0.150∗ 0.148∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Schooling 0.096 0.545∗ 0.907∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.319∗ 0.461∗∗
(0.108) (0.214) (0.341) (0.166) (0.136) (0.243)
Dummy*schooling — -0.548∗ -0.670∗∗ -0.085 -0.245 -0.522∗
(0.240) (0.388) (0.211) (0.212) (0.264)
Dummy (1=rigid) — 0.008 -0.002 0.000 0.007 .014∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.011 -0.027 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.019∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.27
N 98 98 47 80 80 96
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parenthesis;
∗ means signiﬁcant at 5 percent level and
∗∗ at 10 percent.
2. Investment/GDP ratios are averages for for the 1960-2000 period; and schooling is growth of average
years of schooling for population 25 and older. 3. GDP per capita growth rates are trends calculated
for all countries with at least 15 years of observation. Column (6) uses a dummy based on percentage of
government wages and salaries in GDP.
countries with ﬂexible and rigid labor markets. The diﬀerence in the estimated eﬀect for the
two groups of countries, though signiﬁcant in only about half of the regressions, suggests
that education does not mean the same thing across all countries.
These results are suggestive but fall short of identifying causality, in part because of
potential endogeneity. Causation may run from growth of income to schooling rather than
from schooling to growth because returns to education may be higher in growing economies
and therefore induce investment in education (see Bils and Klenow (2000) for a discussion
of causality of education and growth). Labor market ﬂexibility may also be endogenous
(Howell et al. 2007), for example, if growing economies ﬁnd it politically easier to relax
their labor laws. Eliminating bias due to endogeneity generally requires ﬁnding credible
instruments for years of schooling and labor market ﬂexibility, which are not easy tasks.
The extensive literature on education and growth does not oﬀer many good leads for instru-
ments. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) use as instrument an alternative data set for years of
schooling to correct for errors in the schooling variable, but this results in a much smaller
(selected?) sample and much higher standard errors. Pritchett (2001) uses two instruments
(diﬀerent schooling data and neighboring country education) but ﬁnds that the estimated
27IV coeﬃcient for education is not very diﬀerent from OLS. Instruments for labor market
ﬂexibility are equally diﬃcult to ﬁnd. The literature on the role of institutions in growth
provides examples of instruments for institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005, and Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005), but not for labor market ﬂexibility. Changes in labor
market institutions that follow abrupt political shifts, such as right wing military coups,
may provide opportunities for identiﬁcation of the exogenous eﬀect of labor market insinu-
ations on growth in future work. Since our aim in this section is to illustrate the potential
signiﬁcance of labor market institutions in the education-growth relationship, and we are
not aiming at precise measurement of the eﬀect of education on output, searching for valid
and credible instruments for either variable is beyond our scope.
Is the potential bias in our regressions in the diﬀerence between coeﬃcients of schooling
in ﬂexible and rigid countries likely to be large? Predicting the direction of bias of any
coeﬃcient in our regression is complicated by the fact that we are dealing with potentially
two endogenous variables on the right hand side. In general, when there is more than one
endogenous variable, it is diﬃcult to say with any certainty how a speciﬁc coeﬃcient is
aﬀected, for the bias depends on all the parameters of the model (Mayston 2005). But if we
assume that labor market institutions are exogenous to growth, we can say something about
the size of the bias on the coeﬃcient of schooling. Such an assumption can be defended
on grounds that changes in labor market institutions are slow and historically rooted. This
assumption helps reduce our case to the simple case of regressions with only one endogenous
variable, in which the direction of bias depends on the correlation of the endogenous variable
with the error term.
To utilize this intuition, we run separate regressions on the two sets of countries (this
helps us avoid the interaction term which is a second endogenous variable), each deﬁned
based on the value of Heritage dummy. The results of separate regressions in Table 6 are, as
expected, very similar to those in Table 5. The estimated coeﬃcients of growth of schooling
for rigid and ﬂexible countries are, respectively, -0.021 and 0.563, which yield a diﬀerence of
0.542. The regression on rigid countries is much less precisely estimated, and the coeﬃcient
of schooling is insigniﬁcant and close to zero. The same for ﬂexible countries is positive and
signiﬁcant. In both sets of countries causation may go from growth of output to growth
28of schooling, so both coeﬃcients are likely to be overestimates. But since the biases in the
two estimates cancel each other to some extent, the bias in the estimate of their diﬀerence,
which is what interests us most here, is likely to be small.
Table 6: Estimation results for groups of countries








Adjusted R2 0.43 0.16
Our data show a fair degree of correlation between ﬂexibility and per capita income.
Most rigid countries are developing countries and most ﬂexible countries are developed (the
ratio of average per capita GDP of ﬂexible to rigid countries was 2.4 in 1965 and 2.5 in
2000; see also the Appendix for the list of all countries and their rigidity indices). Is per
capita income as good a basis for separating countries into high and low productivity of
education? We tried replacing the ﬂexibility dummy with dummy variables deﬁned on
the basis of various quartiles of income, but we were not able to obtain a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the income dummy as we do with the ﬂexibility dummy. Thus,
the question posed by Pritchett (2001), “Where has all the education gone?”, seems more
apt for countries with rigid labor markets than for developing countries in general. There
are potentially other theories that explain the diﬀerence between the eﬀect of education
on growth besides our model, so we cannot claim these results are a test of the speciﬁc
hypothesis we have advanced in this paper regarding the channel through which ﬂexibility
aﬀects growth.
3.2 Returns to education
The lackluster performance of schooling in growth regressions is even more striking in light
of high private returns to education estimated from micro data for developing countries
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004, Pritchett 2006). Our approach suggests that, as with
29social returns, private returns are also inﬂuenced by labor market ﬂexibility. In this section
we brieﬂy examine the data on this relationship. Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005)
distinguish between three notions of returns to education: (1) private returns, which Mincer
equations estimate; (2) labor productivity returns, which is the eﬀect of education on the
individual’s productivity; and (3) social returns, which, in addition to increased individual
productivity, includes the eﬀects of education on health, family planning, civic behavior,
and so on, as well as external eﬀects. The focus of our model is on the diﬀerence in returns
according to the ﬁrst and the second deﬁnitions. Our model (along with several others)
implies that in distorted labor markets it is the wage structure rather than the structure
of productivity that is reﬂected in Mincer returns. In rigid markets Mincer returns exceed
productivity whereas in ﬂexible markets we expect them to be the same. As with social
returns, the direct implication of our model about private returns does not easily lend itself
to testing. Productivity returns are observable when market are ﬂexible and employers
oﬀer wages based on productivity, but not in rigid markets where they pay according to
credentials.
There is an observable implication of labor market rigidity for Mincer returns which is
worth a look here. If our analysis is valid, market rigidity should increase private returns to
secondary and tertiary education relative to basic (primary and lower secondary) education
because payoﬀ to the latter is mainly in making reaching secondary and tertiary levels.12
In ﬂexible labor markets skills are accumulated along the way and rates of return should
be more or less the same for diﬀerent levels of education. If this conjecture is correct,
two important implications follow: First, high returns to, say, university education do not
justify greater expenditures on higher education. If labor markets are rigid, the relative
rates of return to tertiary and primary levels are no indication of the relative beneﬁts
of investment in them. Second, in rigid markets, in which micro returns do not reﬂect
productivity, schooling capital based on available micro-Mincer returns, as in Bils and
Klenow (2000), overestimate the stock of human capital in these countries. Thus, these
estimates do not improve on years of schooling as a measure of the stock of human capital
12Using a diﬀerent model, Gilles (1996, ch. 10) also shows that higher ﬁring costs tend to increase private
returns to education.
30in growth regressions. By overestimating the stock of human capital, they underestimate
growth of total factor productivity.
Textbook human capital theory suggests that the returns to a year of schooling should
decline with schooling. Data in developed countries do not contradict this theory but
generally reveal a fairly constant rate of return for all years of schooling (about 10 percent
in the USA. See Card 2000). Pritchett (2006) ﬁnds evidence of a negative relationship from
cross country data: average Mincer returns to schooling are lower in countries with more
schooling. But the theory refers to ﬂexible labor markets and the empirical relationship
is based on Mincer returns that assume a linear relationship between wages and years of
schooling. We are interested in rates of return that allow for diﬀerences based on level of
schooling. In rigid labor markets we expect a convex relationship between returns and years
of schooling.
This pattern has been observed in studies of returns to education in individual countries
with rigid labor markets, such as in Egypt, Iran, and Syria (Assaad 1997, Salehi-Isfahani
2005, Huitfeldt and Kabbani 2007). It is also weakly observable in cross country data
on rates of return to primary, secondary and tertiary education from Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos (2004), the same source used by Pritchett (2006). These data are taken from
a variety of empirical studies published mostly in the 1980s and 1990s. There are valid
criticisms of such comparisons across countries because of diﬀerences in quality of data and
estimation methodology (Bennell 1996, Pritchett 2006). A further problem is that once we
match these data to our data on ﬂexibility, the sample drops to only 30 countries, which
makes inference very problematic. But, for what it is worth, a preliminary examination
of this sample reveals interesting diﬀerences in the pattern of returns to schooling based
on labor market ﬂexibility. Table 7 shows the average rates of return for two groups of
countries divided according to the Heritage index. Flexible countries have higher returns at
the primary level but slightly lower at the tertiary level. Returns are on average lower at
the secondary and tertiary levels compared to primary (last two columns). The pattern is
somewhat diﬀerent for rigid countries: average returns to secondary are actually signiﬁcantly
higher than primary for this group of countries, though the same for tertiary level is not
signiﬁcant, and the diﬀerence in diﬀerences for secondary versus primary is only signiﬁcant
31Table 7: Mean private returns to education by labor market ﬂexibility
Average rate of return Diﬀerence in returns
Labor market Sample Primary Secondary Tertiary Sec-prim Ter-prim
Flexible 17 22.87 16.36 20.49 -6.51 -2.38
(5.20) (3.90) (2.39) (3.01) (4.60)
Rigid 13 17.59 18.72 20.46 1.13 2.87
(2.80) (2.82) (3.25) (3.86) (4.64)
Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
at 12 percent.
These diﬀerence in diﬀerences become more signiﬁcant in a regression of the gap in
returns on the labor market ﬂexibility dummy, controlling for the level of economic de-
velopment and schooling. Although the data is too ad hoc and the sample too small for
good inference, there are two intriguing observations to make based on this regression. The
coeﬃcient of the ﬂexibility dummy indicates greater tertiary premium in rigid countries,
and income is negatively correlated with the tertiary premium so, contrary to expectation,
poorer countries have lower tertiary premiums. A similar (but weaker) result holds for the
diﬀerence between secondary and primary returns.
Tertiary-primary = – 12.15 – 0.003 rgdpl +37.77 dummy + 5.30 schooling – 10.10 dummy x schooling
(11.02) (0.001) (17.07) (2.84) (4.18)
N = 30, ¯ R2 = 0.16, and standard errors are in parenthesis. Income and schooling data refer
to 1980 to avoid endogeneity with respect to rates of return which are estimated for later
years.
4 Implications for policy
In evaluating education policies our model suggests paying close attention to labor market
institutions that inhibit ﬂexibility. If the problem that reform intends to redress is caused by
distorted signals of productivity, its eﬀectiveness depends on ﬁrst removing those distortions.
Consider the recommendation to increase public investment in technical and vocational
education and training (TVET), for which returns are presumed high but investment is
32low, especially by more able students.13 Able students prefer to take the formal high
school track because it gives them a shot at more formal schooling at the tertiary level,
even in subjects less in demand, such as the humanities. In a rigid labor market, one
with a “no-return policy”, employers may rationally prefer a graduate of the humanities
who has at least demonstrated certain competencies by passing various tests to a technical
and vocational training graduate whose skills are not fully reﬂected in the certiﬁcate he
holds. How good a welder welds is not as easily measured as his or her knowledge of the
properties of diﬀerent metals. If the argument of this paper is correct, in a rigid labor
market the diﬀerence in testability translates into diﬀerences in rates of return, implying
that public investment in better workshops with more advanced equipment will not attract
the right level of investment from the right type of student until the labor market becomes
more ﬂexible and is able to send the right signals of reward for unobservable skills. This
point that the eﬀect of education reform is sensitive to the level of labor market ﬂexibility
can be generalized to other types of school improvements, such as lower class size and
better teachers, whose main impact is not so much to raise test scores as raise student
motivation, curiosity, self-esteem, and the like. The literature shows school quality and
increased resources for education can raise returns to schooling (Glewwe 2002) and economic
growth (Hanushek and Kimko 2000), but we do not know to what extent obtaining these
results depends on having the right kind of labor market institutions.
By making investment in education endogenous to labor market institutions, our model
oﬀers strong implications for the importance of combining labor market reform with educa-
tion reform. Education systems take their cues from the labor market, so when signals are
distorted, even good education systems produce bad outcomes. The poor match between
what students learn in schools and what they need to be successful in their jobs, or the
emphasis on rote memorization and diplomas (credentialism) rather than acquisition of pro-
ductive skills, are not necessarily signs of badly run schools. Where labor markets reward
diplomas and test scores rather than productive skills, it is natural to expect students and
schools to focus on memorization of facts over acquisition of skills. So, eﬀective education
13For an articulate statement of TVET beneﬁts which does not refer to labor market conditions, see
Internationsl Labour Organization (2002).
33reform presupposes labor market reform. Yet, most discussions of education reform fail to
take this basic point into account.14
The debates on privatization of schools and giving testing a more prominent role in
student evaluation often ignore labor market conditions.15 But, if the labor market sends
the wrong signals of productivity to families and individuals who decide on what to learn
at school, privatization may not only fail to improve productivity of education, it may
exacerbate the problem. In the spirit of the second best theorem of welfare economics,
one could argue that public schools, precisely because they suﬀer from incentive problems
and are less attuned to labor market signals, may actually perform better where the labor
markets are rigid.
Nowhere are the tensions inherent in these debates more evident than in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA), where rigid public employment policies send the strongest
signals for what to learn and national tests dominate the education systems. Pritchett
(1999), who ﬁnds that education in MENA has yielded particularly low social returns and
argues that the region’s education systems produce the wrong kind of education, blames the
low productivity of the educated on public education. But in Iran, where private schools
have ﬂourished in the last decade, the opposite seems to be taking place. Private schools
provide a less varied educational menu for children, are more focused on test taking than
public schools, and typically lack even a yard for children to play in. Private incentives for
test preparation are so strong that they sometimes defy the good intentions of public schools
in oﬀering a more balanced curriculum. Education ministry oﬃcials in Iran complain that
parents defy their policies for minimum participation in arts and sports in public schools
by taking their children out of school for private tutoring during the hours for arts and
sports (Salehi-Isfahani 2002 and 2005). In other countries of the Middle East, too, private
tutoring is popular because public schools do not oﬀer enough test preparation skills.16 The
celebrated Arab Human Development Report (United Nation 2002) which is eloquent on the
14The most recent World Bank ﬂagship report on MENA education focuses entirely on reforms internal
to the education sector, ignoring the role of incentives that originate in the labor market. See (World Bank
2006).
15For a surveys of private education around the world see Tooley (2001) and Toma (2005). For references
to the literature on testing in the US context, see Hanushek and Raymond (2004).
16For Turkey see (Tansel and Bircan 2004). In Egypt the willingness of parents to pay for private tutors
has created an industry which accounts for about 2% of the GDP (World Bank 1998, 24).
34failing of the Arab education systems, and notes in particular that, “Arab education systems
should be restructured to give precedence to creativity and the dignity of productive work,”
and “Education should aim at promoting ...students physical, emotional and societal well-
being as well as their acquisition of knowledge, fails to mention labor market reform in the
chapter on education reform.
Education reform in East Asia has targeted nationwide multiple choice testing regimes
which many consider responsible for rote memorization and learning of a narrow set of skills.
In Japan, where labor market rigidity is blamed for slow growth (Ono and Rebick 2003),
concern over lack of creativity in education has brought pressure to reform the university
entrance examinations but not on labor market rigidity (Schoppa 1991).17 International
emigration of skilled labor from China, which has in eﬀect brought the incentives generated
by the more ﬂexible US labor market to bear on the Chinese education system, is also a
case in point. It appears that local incentives on what to learn are sensitive to even distant
possibilities, as evidenced by the immense popularity of a how-to book on child rearing
which emphasizes character development.18
In sum, success in education reform depends on ﬁrst getting the incentives arising from
the labor market right. Heckman (2000) has used the more comprehensive term human
capital policy to refer to all policies that aﬀect investment in productive skills at home,
in schools, and at the workplace. Good human capital policy in countries that lack well
developed and transparent labor markets should then aim to reduce the distortion in signals
of productivity that families and schools receive from employers before spending resources
on skill training or increasing the responsiveness of teachers and school administrators to
those signals. Fortunately, many policies that increase the transparency of the labor market
can be already found on the agenda of the leading development institutions. Privatization
to reduce the share of public sector in total employment, where signals of productivity travel
17A 1996 “Action Agenda” by the Japanese Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), entitled Developing
Japan’s Creative Human Resources, calls for and end to “Japan’s ‘examination war’ ...which distorts educa-
tion,” and suggests that the “current university entrance examination format, which evaluates the volume of
knowledge by means of points, must be replaced by an examination which includes evaluation of a student’s
scholarship, cognitive ability, interests and basic potential,” and calls for essay writing and an interview as
part of the examinations. http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/pol043.html.
18According to the Harvard Magazine, July-August 2002, the book, entitled Harvard Girl, has sold 1.6
million copies in China.
35the worst, and strengthening social protection programs to reduce the burden of provision
of income protection on the labor market are now actively supported by institutions such as
the World Bank. Labor market reform that increases ﬂexibility is politically very diﬃcult
to implement because it redistributes income from the currently employed to new entrants
and the unemployed. Linking ﬂexibility to learning more useful skills will help strengthen
the case for such reform.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have used a simple model of human capital accumulation to show how
labor market rigidities distort the signals that help individuals choose the optimal mix of
human capital components. In the model we posit two types of human capital: knowledge
which is testable and therefore observable prior to employment, and creativity which is only
observed by employers after a period of employment. To the extent that employers are free
to set wages and decide on termination of employment, that is, labor markets are ﬂexible,
individuals will have the incentive to invest in the right mix of skills. If, on the other hand,
labor market regulation prevents employers from rewarding all skills, then individuals will
invest in observable and testable skills, and educational systems, public or private, will
specialize in the delivery of knowledge at the expense of creativity.
We examine data to show how the insights generated by our model can throw light on
two empirical issues in the literature on education and growth. The ﬁrst is an anomaly in
the literature on cross country regressions in which the usual measure of human capital,
years of schooling, does not appear to account for growth. We conjecture that this may
be because schooling fails to accurately reﬂect the level of creativity in countries with rigid
labor markets, and growth regressions do not control for labor market rigidity. When
we use a dummy variable to separate countries with rigid and ﬂexible labor markets, we
observe that for the latter education is positively associated with growth, while the eﬀect
of education on growth is insigniﬁcant for the former group. We also investigate the eﬀect
of labor market ﬂexibility on private returns to education, about which our model has an
indirect implication, namely that in rigid countries, where credentialism prevails, Mincer
36returns to university and secondary education may be higher than primary, whereas in
ﬂexible countries returns to diﬀerence levels of education should be more uniform, or even
declining.
We hasten to emphasize that while these empirical ﬁndings are consistent with our
model, they are also consistent other theories. As such, we do not view them as proof of
our model’s validity, rather as evidence that taking account of labor market institutions
is important in understanding the role of education in economic growth. Hopefully, our
empirical results are persuasive enough to warrant a more ambitious search for the eﬀects
of labor market ﬂexibility on human capital accumulation.
Our analysis has important implications for education policy. Curricular reform and
improved incentives for teachers and school administrators are eﬀective only when the sig-
nals that parents and schools receive from the labor market regarding rewards for various
types of skills do not conﬂict with the reform’s objectives. For example, getting parents
and schools to teach skills that increase production when employers reward diplomas is an
uphill battle. Labor market reform to increase ﬂexibility should therefore precede education
reform.
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42Data Appendix
We use the following measures of labor market ﬂexibility: three indices published by the
Heritage Foundation (2002), the Economist Intelligence Unit (2004) and the World Bank
(2003a), and a fourth we construct as the ratio of public sector wage and salaries to GDP.
The Heritage and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) indices account for wage and price
ﬂexibility, while the World Bank index is more focused on employment regulation. The
Heritage index is calculated using several sources, including the EIU (Heritage Foundation
2002, 72).19 Because it allows for twice as many countries in the analytical sample as the
EIU index, we prefer the Heritage index to that of the EIU.
The rankings cover three areas: ﬂexibility of hiring, conditions of employment, and ﬂex-
ibility of ﬁring. Flexibility of hiring covers the availability of part-time, ﬁxed-term, and
family members contracts. Conditions of employment cover working time requirements, in-
cluding mandatory minimum daily rest, maximum number of hours in a normal workweek,
premium for overtime work, and restrictions on weekly holidays; mandatory payment for
non-working days, which includes days of annual leave with pay and paid time oﬀ for hol-
idays; and minimum wage legislation. Flexibility of ﬁring covers workers legal protections
against dismissal, including the grounds for dismissal, procedures for dismissal (individual
and collective), notice period, and severance payment. We only use the measures of ﬂexi-
bility of hiring and ﬁring in the World Bank data set as they seem more closely related to
the notion of rigidity used in this paper. These indices range from 1 to 100, from low to
high regulation, suggesting a convenient deﬁnition for the dummy variable: equal to one for
values of the index greater than the median (rigid labor markets) and zero otherwise. Our
fourth and ﬁnal index of ﬂexibility is the ratio of public sector wage and salaries to GDP,
averaged for the period 1960-1999, using data from World Bank (2003b). The shares range
from less than one percent to 17 percent, with a median of 6 percent. We deﬁne a rigidity
dummy equal to one for greater than the median and zero otherwise.
19The Heritage wages and prices factor is scored by “the extent to which a government allows the market
to set wages and prices. Speciﬁcally, this factor looks at which products have prices set by the government,
and whether the government has a minimum wage policy or otherwise inﬂuences wages. The factors scale
measures the relative degree of government control over wages and prices. A very low score of 1 represents
wages and prices that are set almost completely by the market, whereas a very high score of 5 means that
wages and prices are set almost completely by the government (p. 72).
43Table A1. Sample for regression analysis
Country GDP pc Schooling Investment Heritage EIU WB WB Gov.
growth growth GDP ratio index index hiring ﬁring share
1 Algeria 0.01 0.06 0.18 3 3 58 19 7.75
2 Argentina 0.00 0.01 0.17 1 3 58 44 2.51
3 Australia 0.02 0.00 0.24 2 3 33 14 0.51
4 Austria 0.03 0.01 0.26 2 3 33 19 3.90
5 Bangladesh 0.01 0.03 0.1 4 . 33 38 .
6 Barbados 0.04 0.01 0.16 2 . . . 9.90
7 Belgium 0.02 0.00 0.24 2 3 58 22 7.24
8 Benin 0.00 0.07 0.07 3 . 46 21 5.92
9 Bolivia 0.00 0.01 0.1 2 . 58 57 5.95
10 Botswana 0.06 0.05 0.18 2 . 33 19 8.15
11 Brazil 0.02 0.01 0.21 2 3 77 69 2.27
12 Bulgaria -0.03 0.01 0.05 2 3 32 31 2.17
13 Cameroon 0.01 0.03 0.07 3 . 46 45 6.21
14 Canada 0.02 0.01 0.22 2 3 33 17 2.50
15 Cen. Afr. R. -0.03 0.06 0.05 3 . . . 11.79
16 Chile 0.02 0.01 0.15 2 3 55 31 6.13
17 China 0.05 0.02 0.17 3 . 33 42 .
18 Colombia 0.02 0.02 0.12 2 3 33 62 2.61
19 Congo 0.03 0.04 0.19 3 . . . 11.33
20 Costa Rica 0.01 0.01 0.15 2 . 58 47 7.6
21 Croatia 0.04 0.01 0.16 3 . 74 42 9.54
22 Cuba -0.04 0.02 0.03 5 . . . .
23 Cyprus 0.04 0.02 0.26 2 . . . 9.74
24 Czech R. 0.01 0.00 0.22 2 3 0 35 3.01
25 Denmark 0.02 0.00 0.23 1 4 33 12 5.24
26 Dominican R. 0.04 0.01 0.13 3 . . . 16.53
27 Ecuador 0.02 0.02 0.2 3 3 35 67 5.28
28 Egypt 0.03 0.05 0.07 3 3 33 46 7.94
29 El Salvador 0.00 0.02 0.07 2 . . . 7.03
30 Fiji 0.02 0.02 0.16 3 . . . 10.32
31 Finland 0.02 0.02 0.26 2 2 68 57 3.04
32 France 0.02 0.01 0.25 3 3 60 31 7.01
33 The Gambia 0.00 0.05 0.06 3 . . . 6.54
34 Ghana 0.00 0.04 0.08 2 . 33 16 4.68
35 Greece 0.02 0.02 0.26 3 4 74 29 9.31
36 Guatemala 0.01 0.02 0.08 3 . 58 53 4.27
37 Guyana 0.01 0.01 0.19 2 . . . 13.35
38 Haiti 0.01 0.04 0.05 3 . . . 5.61
39 Honduras 0.00 0.03 0.13 3 . 33 49 5.57
40 Hong Kong 0.05 0.02 0.25 2 4 33 1 .
41 Hungary 0.02 0.01 0.19 2 4 43 22 3.93
42 Iceland 0.02 0.01 0.27 2 . . . 7.45
43 India 0.03 0.03 0.12 4 4 22 19 1.79
44 Indonesia 0.04 0.03 0.13 2 4 74 43 2.76
45 Iran 0.00 0.05 0.19 4 1 33 48 11.17
46 Ireland 0.04 0.01 0.19 2 4 33 12 5.37
47 Israel 0.02 0.01 0.27 2 4 33 16 7.61
48 Italy 0.03 0.01 0.24 2 3 64 24 5.66
49 Jamaica 0.00 0.02 0.19 2 . 33 13 8.64
50 Japan 0.03 0.01 0.32 2 4 39 19 .
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51 Jordan 0.02 0.04 0.14 2 . 58 55 15.35
52 Kenya 0.01 0.04 0.11 2 . 33 17 8.04
53 Lesotho 0.02 0.01 0.17 3 . . . 12.23
54 Malawi 0.01 0.01 0.14 3 . 33 44 5.02
55 Malaysia 0.04 0.03 0.21 3 5 33 9 7.77
56 Mali 0.00 0.05 0.08 3 . 52 21 6.89
57 Malta 0.06 0.01 0.18 3 . . . 12.64
58 Mauritius 0.04 0.02 0.12 4 . . . 8.05
59 Mexico 0.01 0.03 0.18 2 3 80 71 3.84
60 Mozambique -0.03 0.04 0.03 3 . 58 71 .
61 Nepal 0.02 0.11 0.12 3 . 33 49 .
62 New Zealand 0.01 0.01 0.21 2 4 33 4 6.50
63 Nicaragua -0.03 0.02 0.11 3 . 33 59 6.92
64 Niger -0.02 0.05 0.07 3 . 52 38 2.89
65 Norway 0.03 0.02 0.32 3 3 42 30 3.38
66 Pakistan 0.03 0.02 0.12 3 3 48 18 .
67 Panama 0.02 0.02 0.21 2 . 80 67 10.73
68 Paraguay 0.02 0.02 0.11 3 . . . 3.92
69 Peru 0.00 0.02 0.18 2 4 34 70 3.75
70 Philipines 0.01 0.02 0.15 3 . 58 57 4.47
71 Poland 0.01 0.01 0.24 3 3 33 46 4.77
72 Portugal 0.03 0.02 0.21 2 4 74 70 9.47
73 Romania 0.03 0.02 0.28 3 3 47 30 3.28
74 Russia -0.02 0.01 0.17 3 3 68 68 3.10
75 Rwanda 0.00 0.03 0.04 3 . . . 5.07
76 Senegal 0.00 0.01 0.07 4 . 46 29 9.57
77 Singapore 0.06 0.03 0.44 2 5 33 11 5.96
78 Slovak R. -0.01 0.00 0.24 3 . 32 61 5.09
79 Slovenia 0.03 0.01 0.22 3 . 52 45 8.20
80 South Africa 0.00 0.02 0.12 2 2 33 16 6.26
81 Spain 0.02 0.02 0.25 2 3 74 50 5.76
82 Sri Lanka 0.03 0.01 0.11 2 5 33 42 4.99
83 Swaziland 0.00 0.04 0.18 3 . . . 9.99
84 Sweden 0.02 0.01 0.22 2 2 55 39 2.77
85 Switzerland 0.01 0.01 0.27 2 5 33 26 1.26
86 Syria 0.03 0.04 0.13 4 . 33 24 8.79
87 Thailand 0.05 0.02 0.31 2 3 60 43 4.87
88 Togo -0.01 0.06 0.07 3 . . . 8.56
89 Trinidad 0.02 0.02 0.1 2 . . . 9.04
90 Tunisia 0.03 0.05 0.17 2 . 71 38 9.73
91 Turkey 0.02 0.03 0.16 3 3 58 20 6.09
92 Uganda 0.01 0.03 0.02 2 . 17 50 2.06
93 United Kingdom 0.02 0.01 0.18 2 5 33 20 4.59
94 United States 0.02 0.01 0.19 2 4 33 8 2.41
95 Uruguay 0.02 0.01 0.12 2 . 58 3 5.99
96 Venezuela -0.01 0.02 0.16 4 3 . . 6.00
97 Zambia -0.02 0.04 0.19 3 . 33 0 9.84
98 Zimbabwe 0.01 0.03 0.22 4 . 33 20 9.14
Notes: Growth rates of GDP per capita and years of schooling are based on estimated trends. Government
share is the percentage of public sector wage and salaries in GDP.
45